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Abstract. We develop a series of theses on the philosophical aesthetics of design
art. A sketch of an outline of a theory of objects is drawn from within a naturalistic
worldview, that of abstract materialism and the general, still ongoing, quest to
build a comprehensive philosophy of nature encompassing not only the physical
world, but also culture, art, and politics.
An object is the final product of a process of ontological seeing. However, an
object is not seen by the eyes, but felt by the mind. Objects do not exist for us;
they belong with the universal process of thinking-in-nature. When I say ‘there is an
object here,’ what I mean is that something outside myself has suddenly grasped my
attention and made me aware of its real presence. In a certain way, the structure of
“this-something” is more active (and hence more fundamental) than my own transitory
self-cognitive and perceptual capacities.
One of the fundamental pillars of a new theory of objects is the nonfoundational status
of the human subject. In the ontology of nature, objects are free of the observer’s
consciousness. There are no seeing-beings informing the hypostasis of objecthood in
the real world.
An object is an emerging field of ontological vision. The object in the world is grasped
by an essentially nonpersonalistic feeling already infused into the being of the object.
Therefore, the object is not produced by the seeing agent’s mind, but both mind and
objects are eventually made of the same “stuff”: perceiviedenss.
In order to bypass idealism, a theory of objects in aesthetics is necessary. Here, our
goal is not to study the sociological structure of the system of objects, but rather the
onto-aesthetic status of objecthood as such.
For us, an object is a sector of being that somehow fell into our ownmost sphere
of vision. The artist and the philosopher are both concerned with the ontological
status of objecthood in the world. It is not merely because common sense apparently
suggests that the world is nothing but a collection of objects (a theory we reject here,
in agreement with Heidegger1), but more importantly because learning how to live in
a creative tension with surrounding objects is an important factor in our education as
human persons. Although the theory of objects must renounce the Cartesian-Kantian
Ego, we are still going to pay considerable attention to the various subtle mechanisms




But the process of personal development can be seen as extending even beyond the
human by further embracing the animal world.3 In general, we would like to envisage
an ethological theory of aesthetics in conjunction with objects and design.
We must distinguish between design and architecture. Classically put, architecture is
about constructing buildings, while – in our view – design is all about things.
Instead of ‘things’, we say objects.
The work that lays in front of us herein is A Theory of Objects. It is part of Aesthetic
Theory, a Division of Being and Nature.4
We don’t address only architects, designers, engineers, mathematicians, scientists,
painters, sculptors. First of all, we are philosophers. Philosophy is a way of life. It
has no purpose, no goals, no aims, no objectives. The intention of the philosophical
act is to create for the sake of creation as such. To create means to live. And living
well is the prime motor of the philosophical vocation of man and woman.5
Design is the discourse of creating formed objects. Objects are not mere things. For
something to become an object, it must go through a process of transformation. But
instead of saying ‘transformation of things’, we prefer the metamorphoses of objects.
For a thing to become an object, it must enter into a social process.6 The making of an
object is akin to the production of commodities.7 But design and economics, though
subtly interrelated, are not identical. There is a fundamental difference between the
two. Design is a subfield of aesthetics; economics is a subdiscipline of sociology.
An object is a thing designed for play (aesthetics.8) An object is a thing produced
(technology.9) An object is a commodity that has exchange value (economics.10) In
fact, objects are located right at the intersection of the three fields of aesthetics,
technology, and economics. We can’t fully grasp the essence of object-hood without
paying careful attention to what those three disparate discourses have to say on the
subject. We need to learn patience and humility, we need first to become students.
Fundamentally speaking, objects can not be grasped conceptually, because logic,
judgement, classification, analogy, and the entire conceptual apparatus of language
do not capture the essence of object-hood.11 What makes an object as such is not
merely a context of use (economics), but rather the environment inside which it dwells.
Dwelling will immediately take us into a theory of space. To live “inside something”
is like sharing common resources with others. Space is sharing. Sharing is living.
Objects are implanted into the Other. The Other is that which lies outside my direct
innermost sphere. We must learn how to disentangle the inside and the outside of the
same thing: Objects do not pop out like isolated “individuated” heaps of countable
ejected “stuff.” Instead, every object is a complex structure composed of core and its
surrounding world.
3Jakob von Uexküll [8, 9].
4Mikki [10].





10Marx [18]; Baudrillard [19,20].
11Heidegger [1, 21].
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The ontological bifurcation of an object into core and world does not present a
return to Cartesian dualism. We are not trying to reinstall those worn-out binary
structures of mind/body, spirit/flesh, I/You, Subject/Object that have been damaging
and distorting the quest for philosophical truth. Core-and-World is a framework for
ontology. It is post-human and material, but also nonreductionist in scope and spirit.
The major goal of philosophy: To exclude the Cartesian Subject, the Despotic
Signifier, the Ego, Consciousness, Ego-Consciousness, the Transcendental Self,
Personal Deity, etc.12 Those are to be ejected and replaced by Nature, Thinking,
Pantheistic Deity, and so on. How does such reorientation of philosophy’s scope in the
large intersect with the theory of objects? In several very important ways. First of
all, we no longer take for granted the basic structure of ‘economics-as-human-social-
science’ to be the most fundamental constitutive factor for defining what objects are.
Objects are no longer reducible to the commodity form, and the orthodox Marxist
hypostasis of use and exchange values in which the latter became the primary defining
ontological structure of object-as-commodity-form will be rejected here. Objects are
to be seen now as final outcomes resulting from a long and complex nonpersonalistic,
nonhuman process of material individuation. In order for this to make sense, we must
develop in parallel a theory of nonhuman sociology, which in fact is the task of the
Division on Society and Organization in Being and Nature. Within this intellectual
framework, objects are incomprehensible outside social relations, this remains true,
but the seachange of experience is that the very concept of the ‘social’ we are operating
with has to undergo a substantial and almost complete transformation. Against
sociology as a science of human organization, we study social ontology, which is a
discourse on multiplicities of organisms and anti-organisms. Objects in this view are
still defined by their “context of use” though now with respect to generalized agents
we call organisms instead of the celebrated “rational agents” of Weberian sociology.13
Moreover, since every organism is already bounded by the explosive/implosive field
of the anti-organismic, the concept of object-hood as such becomes inherently and
fundamentally metastable14; that is, and in a first-order approximation, objects are
never fixed or completed wholes. They are always changing and transforming into
something else.
As an artist, I have now to face objects in a manner quite different from that adopted
by the classical aesthetic theories of Hegel and Adorno.15 For me, the creator and
consumer of formed matter, the object is like being itself, a structure embedded into
a larger structure. Every kitchen utensil and chair and room is enclosed within the
larger confines of an environing field, that of the world.
Object = Core + World.
This is not a formula, neither binary nor dualistic. The scheme above is a framework
for thinking about objects, not a prescription. Nor an instruction. In art, we are
against method and methodology.
The Core is not a substantial being. It is not Aristotelian, though respectful of the
original impulses in Aristotle’s thinking. We disagree with Aristotle’s followers, not
12Guattari [22]; Deleuze [23].
13Weber [24].
14Simondon [25,26].
15Hegel [27]; Adorno [28].
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the master himself, who continues to be extremely interesting even while erring.
The World is not a spatial space. It is not a container. It is not physical space,
though the latter is conditioned by the World. The World belongs to ontology. It is a
philosophical conception of the Real, while the Real is secondary since it is produced,
that is, subsequent and posterior to that which created it.
Deleuze wished to rehabilitate the Platonic conception of the Idea even while critiquing
Plato.16 He installed the Idea as the “genetic cause” we just alluded to above. But
for us there are no efficient causes, and even Deleuzian Ideas do not count as such
formative agents. The object is produced, that’s all right, but the producer need not
be known or anticipated in a causal fashion. It is highly probable that every object
“we” design is in fact created by Nature in a way making it impossible to trace this
genetic act back into any localizable “part” of the sum total of that holistic system
named ‘Nature’. Nature produces whether through human or nonhuman agents, that
is all.
If we reject all Platonic17 and Neoplatonic18 theories of origins, including those highly
modern and sophisticated ones developed by Deleuze19 and Whitehead,20 then we
have no other alternative than going back to the Heideggerian scheme of being-in-the-
world.21 There, the object is thought of as a “composite” of the form Core + World.
But we must guard against the danger of reinterpretation and overinterpretation. We
are not reactivating the Heideggerian Machine, but also we don’t wish to bypass
Heidegger. The relationship of the philosopher to previous philosophers is quite
complex. It has nothing to do with the anathema of schools and followers. What
are we, anyway?
The object has a material constitution. This constitution carves out its visible
boundaries. Therefore, there must be some “observer” capable of “seeing” the object.
This, in a nutshell, is the Cartesian ontology par excellence. But if we now turn toward
the anti-subjective view, thinking of the object as an inextricable “compound” of Core
and World, then things will look quite different. Here, an object needs not be “seen”
at all since it is already enveloped within an infinite open field of clearing, that which
we referred to as World. The World “sees” the object’s Core, even when there are
no humans around; the object’s “interior essence” is unthinkable without its all-caring
atmosphere supplied by its World. The World is already “observing” the object’s flesh,
and the object’s Core acquires its existential legitimacy from the structure of being-
embraced-by-the-other enacted by this engendering World. The World is the Other
of the Object’s Core, and this otherness has nothing to do with any ego or subject
associated with the designer or producer of the object under consideration.
The purpose of design: To distance the self from the Cartesian Subject, the artist-as-
designer becoming a non-Ego, though still conscious of his position in the world.
An object is not something you design for some “social application”; it is not here
“for an other” or made under some obligation toward certain external institutions.
Objects are created by nature; even if the designer happens to be human, that does
16Deleuze [23].
17Plato [29].





not change the essence of the problematic of design as art, because the latter has no
strategic objectives. The ultimate aim of art is to have no purpose whatsoever. Yet,
in contrast to Capitalism, art is not production for the sake of production as such.
Art and Capitalism are poles apart. One cannot tolerate the other, and in general
the relationship between the two has always been tense, even though they both have
learned how to live with the co-presence of each other.
Object design is a revolt against representation, exactly like some powerful currents
of abstract painting. In the aesthetic theory of design, the guiding formula is this:
Non-objective art is transformed into abstract object design. The question now is
the following: Does an object design aim at conveying an objective meaning? The
answer of postmodern design is plainly negative. Object design uses objects as medium
but not in order to communicate any semantic or philosophical message to some
presupposed audience. It is true that objects are still designed to be sold, not to
be viewed in a museum or an art gallery, but that does not make them amenable
to any instrumental reckoning. The truth is that the designer in the postmodern
moment is facing the dilemma of being both an artist and a professional. In contrast
to the painter, he cannot just proclaim something like “total art” or “pure free
art” as his zealously-guarded mission to humanity.22 By merely being postmodern
artists, designers are not bound to obey even the most radical intellectual currents of
thought. The designer, if he wishes to be an artist, must first of all transform himself
into a philosopher. Only a philosopher-artist is a postmodern artist, and only as a
postmodern artist a designer can be an artist.
Design is the creation of new objects for no apparent reason other than the whim of
the moment, the desire to live in freedom. Freedom is the prime mover of the design
artist in his quest for change and societal reform.
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